Report by the German foreign ministry
on the propaganda and political agitation
of the Soviet Government


The German foreign ministry is in possession of comprehensive proofs that subversive and revolutionary propaganda on a large scale with a pronounced anti-German tendency has been launched from Moscow into other countries. The old idea of a world revolution is being pursued as before, Even after the conclusion of the German-Soviet friendly agreement, Germany was placed on a par with Britain and France and continued to be regarded as a capitalistic State which must be annihilated. Pacts with Germany are merely being used as a tactical means for making the best use of a favourable political situation.

These tendencies are revealing themselves consistently in every country in the propaganda carried on by the USSR. They are particularly clearly defined in the "Directions for a campaign of organization and ideology within the Communist Party in Slovakia," issued in October 1939. These directions are based on a statement made by M. Lenin, according to which pacts may be concluded with individual capitalist countries, provided they serve the interests of the Soviet Union and create a possibility of rendering the opponent innocuous. Tactical collaboration with Germany, the directions continue, fully corresponds with these words of Lenin. The aim of the Soviet policy is outlined in the following words: "The Soviet Union and its Red Army can thereby avoid losses and hold themselves ready to attack the weakened enemy at an opportune moment in an opportune place."

The same ideas recur in pamphlets which have been spread over the most varying countries in Europe. Thus in a pamphlet printed in Switzerland, the present Soviet policy is described in another statement made by M. Lenin: "As soon as we are strong enough to strike down the whole of capitalism, we shall immediately grip it by the throat."

Papers and periodicals appearing in Moscow again and again provide world revolution slogans for the Communists in every country. Significant, for example, is a leading article in the periodical "Intematsionalnyi Maiak" (1941, No. 1), entitled "Lenin's cause will be victorious throughout the world," which runs as follows: "Led by our comrade Stalin, the great follower of Lenin, our country is progressing boldly and convincedly towards Communism. The international proletariat, the suppressed and impoverished masses throughout the world are repeating with convinced hopefulness the prophetic words of Lenin: 'Let the bourgeoisie rage a little longer, let them calmly murder thousands of workmen, victory is ours and the victory of the Communist world revolution is assured.'" Further: "Under this militant revolutionary banner, the banner of the Communist International, are united the proletarians and the workers of the whole world for the last and decisive blow against capitalism, for the victory of the socialist revolution, for Communism." (vol. 41, No. 4.) The same tone is observed by leading personalities in Moscow, who emphasize again and again the international mission of the Soviet Union. Thus M. Molotov stated in a speech, held in December 1939: "For the international Communist movement, M. Stalin is not only the leader of Bolshevism and the leader of the USSR, but also the natural leader of world Communism"; and in an article which appeared in March 1940: "We shall remain true to the end to the trust bequeathed to us, namely, that Communism must always remain international." Stalin also said in a speech in January 1940 "We have been, victorious under Lenin's flag in our battle for the October Revolution. Under the same flag we shall be victorious in the proletarian revolution throughout the world."

Hand in hand with this incitement to world revolution, we find war and armament propaganda in the Soviet Union itself, intended for home use and steadily increasing in violence. In countless speeches and proclamations, the Russian people are being summoned to military preparedness and joyfully to stake their all. Sufficient in this connection is a manifesto issued by Marshal Budyonny at the turn of the year 1940/41, in which the youth of the country is called upon never to forget "that at a moment when almost the whole globe is involved in war, Stalin's injunctions must be loyally fulfilled: the whole country must be kept in a state of tireless and constant militant and mobilized preparedness. Daily and hourly we must occupy ourselves with the science of war, thus preparing ourselves to carry out the order to fight. We must constantly bear in mind that only a soldier who is deeply versed in the science of war can deal a death blow to the enemy." At the end of May 1941, the District Commissar Batanov wrote in the Pravda that it was necessary "for the Soviet Union to. prepare for war day by day." Again and again the whole Soviet Press echoes the same words: "Our Red Army is an army of world revolution and the world proletariat."

These general ideas, propagated everywhere in Europe, concerning continuous work for a world revolution and military preparation for this purpose within the Soviet Union, are, in consequence of the military successes of the Axis Powers, being directed increasingly against Germany, and in individual countries are being supplemented by a concrete, steadily growing, agitation against the Reich. AH difficulties experienced by the Various European States in their home and foreign policy are being used as. arguments for this virulent campaign. In Romania the agitation carried on by the Communists did not even decline during 'the first months after the conclusion of the German-Russian Friendship Pact. An official Romanian source declared to the German Minister on 15 February 1940 that the Romanian Communists were strongly anti- National Socialist and anti-German in their utterances and circular letters. They were not influenced in the least by the official policy followed by Moscow and Berlin. In complete accord with this statement, Communist propaganda in Romania declared that only Germany was responsible for the difficulties experienced by that country in its home policy and for its serious economic situation. The national passions inflamed by the solution found for the Transylvanian question were exploited for agitation against the Vienna Arbitration Award, in other words, against the Reich Government. After Romania had signed the Tripartite Pact, attempts, although fruitless, were made to stir up the population against the German troops. All this was done with the assistance of pamphlets and leaflets the lay-out and mode of printing of which betrayed the fact they came from abroad, and which, according to information supplied by competent Romanian authorities, had been brought to Bucharest by couriers of the Soviet Legation.

In Yugoslavia, from the late summer of 1940 onwards, an anti-German orientation in Communist propaganda was also to be observed. In a circular letter sent by the administrative bodies of the Drava Banovina in Ljubljana to subordinate bodies on 5 August 1940, it is stated that according to information available, the Communist propaganda, in contrast to previously, was aiming at "organizing future hostile manifestations against Germany and Italy." This assertion made by the Serbian authorities was confirmed by Communist leaflets distributed particularly in Carniola. Thus, in the leaflet distributed on 23 August 1940 in connection with the anniversary of the signing of the German-Russian Treaty, the Yugoslav Government were attacked because they had carried on a policy of rapprochement towards Rome and Berlin, and had attempted to make use of Yugoslavia to serve the imperialistic ends of Germany and Italy. This propaganda demanded that Yugoslavia's foreign policy should work towards rapprochement with Russia. A Communist leaflet distributed in Zagreb in November similarly attacks Maček because he had "attempted to sell the country to the Fascist Imperialists in Berlin and Rome." In a leaflet circulated in Carniola on the anniversary of the Russian revolution on 7 November 1940, a protest was demanded against the policy of trafficking with the imperialist Governments of Berlin and Rome that the Cvetković regime was carrying on. The same purpose was served by the mass demonstrations staged by the Soviets. During one of these demonstrations, when arrests happened to be made by the Yugoslav police, it was discovered that employees of the Belgrade Soviet Legation were included amongst the arrested persons.

From time to time Russian intentions to conquer the Balkans and German occupied areas were openly proclaimed in Communist circles. Thus the German Legation in Belgrade reported on 13 September 1940 that, a few weeks before, at a meeting of Communist Party functionaries in Zagreb, one of those present declared "that according to information received from Russia, the territories of Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as those portions of the Polish area now occupied by German troops, were to be described as a Russian protectorate. This new measure, however, could only be carried out after Germany, as was expected, had been weakened in the military sphere."

That such statements about Russia's future intentions against Germany were really communicated to Serbian Communists and sympathizers with the Soviets by the Russians themselves, is shown by a document found, after Belgrade had been occupied, in the Soviet Legation there. The document summarizes in what way russophile Serbian groups were informed by the Russians of the attitude of the Soviet Union after Romania had linked up with the Axis Powers. This document in the Russian language, which according to its contents dates from the autumn of 1940, reads as follows: "The USSR will not react until the opportune moment occurs. The Axis Powers have further dissipated their forces and the USSR will consequently strike a sudden blow against Germany. When they do so, the USSR will cross the Carpathians, which will be the signal for a revolution in Hungary; after having passed through Hungary, the troops will proceed to Yugoslavia and press forward to the Adriatic and will then separate the Balkans and the Near East from Germany. When will this happen? At the moment which the Soviets consider most suitable for the success of this undertaking. At the same time, a revolution will break out in France.

In Yugoslavia, as the present economic situation becomes steadily worse, the masses will be more and more radicalized. If shortage of food is as great during the coming winter as the cold, Yugoslavia in the spring will be like a powder barrel needing nothing but a match."

In Bulgaria the German-Soviet Friendship Pact was interpreted by Communist propaganda as a complete capitulation on the part of Germany before the strength of Russia and, whilst Germany was reviled in the most shameful manner, the people were incited to continue their struggle against Fascism and German-Italian aggression. In Bulgarian official quarters a general intensification of Bolshevist propaganda in the South-Eastern European States was noted during the summer of 1940. In Bulgaria, too, Bolshevist propaganda attempted to use nationalist slogans. Thus in the question of the Dobruja, the moderate and responsible policy of the Bulgarian Government was branded as weak, and the support of the Soviet Union for a more drastic action was foreshadowed.

In Hungary Bolshevist propaganda could scarcely find any support, as the recollection of the reign of terror of Béla Kun was still too vivid there. All the more ruthlessly, therefore, did the Soviet Union pursue its secret propaganda in the regions with a Ruthenian minority given back to Hungary in March 1939, and allied this propaganda with annexationist aims. Thus the Amsterdam Newspaper Algemeen Handelsblad reported on 30 December 1939 that Soviet stars and hammers and sickles were to be seen everywhere on the walls of those districts. Leaflets were being distributed continuously and voluminously, most probably smuggled in from Russia. These leaflets stated that Daddy Stalin, the father of all the Russians and kindred national groups, and Brother Voroshilov, would liberate the poor suppressed Ruthenian people from their Hungarian overlords. That the Soviet Union was actually harbouring aggressive intentions against Hungary is revealed in a report from the Greek Minister in Ankara, dated 3 February 1941 and found in Athens. According to this, the Soviet Minister declared to his Greek colleague "that Hungary as yet had nothing to fear from Russia," but that he "by no means excluded such a possibility for the future."

In Slovakia propaganda was entirely based on the directions referred to above, which contained detailed instructions for the work of the Communist Party. The struggle against the Government in power was to be propagated by infiltration in the Hlinka Guard and the State trade unions. Actually, an extremely lively agitation by means of leaflets, inscriptions on walls, handbills and Communist symbols was carried on, the sharply anti-German tendency being paired with efforts openly aiming at annexation of the country by the Soviet Union. The fact that the propaganda was being directed by the Soviet Legation in Bratislava is in this case particularly clearly displayed; as the Havas Agency testified in March 1940, the subversive material was being printed on the premises of the Legation. Particularly intensive were the Soviet Russian machinations in Eastern Slovakia, where the confused national conditions gave an excuse for nationalist and Pan-Slavic slogans.

In Sweden, the Communist Party is indeed not particularly large numerically; but it has special importance in regard to the international activity of the Comintern. As Sweden is the only country in Europe in which Communism is not forbidden, a portion of the Communist activity previously carried on in the German Austria, in the former Czechoslovakia, as well as in Switzerland and in France, has been transferred to Sweden. Thus; for instance, the official organ of the Comintern, Die Rundschau, formerly published in Basel, is now printed in Stockholm. The main propagandist organ of the Swedish Communists is the daily paper, Ny Dag, which is of particular importance for the Soviet Union, as it is now probably the only legally and regularly published Communist daily paper appearing in a neutral country in Europe. The attitude of this paper, which is financially supported by Soviet Russia, is becoming increasingly anti-German; great care is, moreover, being taken that the anti-German articles in Ny Dag are spread throughout the world. Thus, at the end of April 1941, this paper published an alleged manifesto of German Communist youth, in which the German measures against Yugoslavia were most violently condemned. How careful they were that this anti-German article should be read internationally, is described in the following, report from the correspondent of the New York Times in Stockholm, dated 29 April 1941: "Today's issue of the Communist Swedish paper was sent to the British and American newspaper correspondents in a closed envelope. The manifesto to which I have referred was marked with blue pencil, as though the Swedish Section of the Communist International attached particular value to its publication abroad. This unusual document, with its violent attack upon Hitler and his policy, contains a clear call to revolt and defeatism. It threatens disapproval on the part of Moscow. The document is generally believed here to have come from the Comintern in Moscow. Observers in Stockholm regard the manifesto as a new and impressive sign of the rapid deterioration in the relations between the USSR and Germany."

In Finland, Bolshevist propaganda came to a standstill during the Russo-Finnish War. After peace had been signed, the Soviet Legation in Helsinki immediately proceeded to reconstruct the Communist Party, which at first was organized in small cells. For actual propaganda purposes the "Association for Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union" was founded, amongst the members of which – according to sentences pronounced in the Finnish Court – numerous criminal elements were found. Petrozavodsk broadcasting station was erected by the Russian State Broadcaster in the neighbourhood of the Finnish frontier for propaganda purposes. In numerous agitational transmissions it attempted to disturb the home political situation in Finland and to keep the Finnish Government under constant pressure. Here, too, the aim was to impair friendly relations between Finland and the Reich.

In France, the efforts of French politicians, who after the defeat of the Third Republic had endeavoured to enlist the sympathy of the French people for a policy of collaboration with Germany and for European solidarity, were systematically obstructed by Moscow. The members of the Pétain Government were described as corrupt traitors and hirelings of small capitalistic groups. The economic and social difficulties experienced by France after her defeat were exclusively attributed to the occupation of the country by Germany. Almost every leaflet and illegal newspaper ended with a call for a Bolshevist revolution and for coöperation with Soviet Russia, which would bring about an end of all present distress. In Belgium and Holland, too, anti-German Communist agitation with the same end in view is extremely active.

In the Government General, Soviet propaganda started directly after the demarcation of the German and Russian spheres of interest. Here it appeals in particular with Pan-Slavic ideals to Polish nationalism, and attempts to represent the Soviet Union to these circles as the future liberator from German domination. On the other hand, the Russians naturally have not the slightest scruple about using Jews to falsify passports and carry news. Recently vain efforts have been made to approach German troops with agitational subversive propaganda.

Even in Greece, according to reports from the Plenipotentiary of the Reich there, the Bolsheviks have already attempted in the few weeks which have elapsed since the German entry into that country to incite afresh the Greek people, who had been left in the lurch by Britain, against Germany and Italy. As everywhere in the occupied territories, here, too, a revolution is being prepared in the event of a Russo-German war, and linking up with the Soviet Union is proclaimed as a panacea for overcoming difficulties.

Thus Russian propaganda in every country in Europe is trying to make use of the difficulties and upheavals which the war has brought with it, in order to assist its world-revolutionary machinations. This revolutionary agitation is being bound up with steadily increasing incitement against the Reich and its attempts to create a new and stable order in Europe.


The other means of political agitation employed by the Soviet Union in the above-mentioned countries are in exact accordance with the underground propaganda outlined in the foregoing. Moscow has thus attempted again and again to obstruct Germany in her role of mediator in settling territorial differences between Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, and to prevent the Balkans States from joining the Tripartite Pact. The German-Italian guarantee for the new Romanian frontiers was falsely represented by Communist agitation as an aggressive anti-Russian measure. Particularly active work was done by Moscow to prevent Bulgaria from joining the Tripartite Pact. A special delegate from the Soviet Union was sent to King Boris at the end of November 1940 to frustrate a rapprochement between Bulgaria and the Axis Powers, and at the same time to draw Bulgaria into the Soviet net by offering her a guarantee pact. The Russians attempted to support this mission by mobilizing the Bulgarian Communists, who had to stage mass petitions to the Government. When, a few months later, Bulgaria consented to allow German troops to enter the country, the Soviet Government, although they had received detailed information beforehand from the Reich Government about the aims and intentions of the German measures in the Balkans, converted themselves into a tool for British propaganda by asserting in an intentionally hostile public proclamation that the Bulgarian attitude would result in drawing that country into the war – an assertion which has since been sufficiently contradicted by actual facts.

In Romania, Russian efforts since the autumn of 1940 have aimed at increasing the domestic political difficulties of the new regime in every respect, and preparing for civil war by instigating unrest. As early as November 1940, Communists and paid agents were smuggled into the Legionary Movement, and attempted to utilize internal Romanian conflicts for the turbid aims of Moscow. The summit of the Communist agitation which had already made its appearance in November 1940 in local putsch schemes, especially in the oil regions, was reached in the attempted revolt of the extremist Legionaries on 23 and 24 January 1941, which, as has been incontrovertibly proved, was to a large extent due to Bolshevist agents and local Communist leaders. After the putsch had failed, some leaders of the revolt took refuge in the Soviet Legation in order thus to escape arrest. The German Minister in Bucharest reported, on 11 February 1941, on the background of the attempted putsch as follows: "The revolt was planned by Russian elements who attempted by this means to bridge the way to Bulgaria via Romania, as well as by agents of the British Secret Service. Both immediately recognized the situation and made full use of it. Anybody familiar with their methods is quite certain that they have had a hand in it, Their plan was to create confusion at all costs in order to bring about disorder in Romania, a territory of economic and military importance for Germany."

Equally clear are the Russian intrigues with regard to Moscow's attitude in Yugoslavia, French documents which have been found have informed the Reich Government about remarks made in May 1940 by the Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov to the Yugoslav Delegate Djordjevich, which clearly show that Molotov in his talks with Yugoslavia attempted from the very first to show an anti-German attitude, whereas in talking about France and Britain he used terms "which exhibited no ill-will." In so doing, Molotov, as Djordjevich stated, openly indicated the possibility that Russia would oppose every Italian and German action in the Danube area. Beyond this, the Soviet Government on this occasion urged Yugoslavia to hasten her armament programme and stated that they were prepared to support this programme by supplies of arms on credit.

Djordjevich gained the impression in Moscow that Germany was regarded there as the adversary of tomorrow. "Germany is already the mighty foe against which Moscow is preparing itself." The Yugoslav delegate also thought himself entitled to say that Russia "was trying to delay, rather than to hasten, the deliveries promised to Germany, with every means in her power." Military quarters in Belgrade expressed a similar opinion about the Russian attitude. In one note of 24 June 1940, found in the documents of the Yugoslav General Staff, it is stated that "the foreign policy of the USSR is wholly independent of that of Germany, consequently surprises, even for Germany, are not out of the question."

Russia's fundamental attitude is shown with special clarity in the matter of Russian armament supplies to Serbia, on which light is thrown by the Serbian War Office records found in Belgrade.

At the suggestion of the Soviet Government, the Serbian Minister in Moscow handed a specification of the war material required by Serbia to Vyshinsky, the assistant of Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on 14 November 1940, Only a week later, on 21 November, the Serbian Military Attache received the answer from the Russian General Staff, "We will give you everything requested and that immediately." The Russians became still more accommodating; still more. material could be supplied and Yugoslavia could determine the prices and method of payment herself. The Yugoslav Military Attache was in a position to report that the Russians for their part were willing "to provide war material on a large scale." The only condition made by the Russians was absolute secrecy; in particular, care should be taken to prevent Germany, Bulgaria and Romania from learning anything of the consignment of materials. The Yugoslav Military Attache in Moscow repeatedly expressed the desire that these negotiations should be carried out exclusively through military channels, as otherwise a leakage was to be feared. The military authorities were above all afraid of the Axis Powers getting to know of the intended purchases.

From this it is obvious that Yugoslav military circles realized that rearmament carried out at the instigation of Russia was a measure directed against the Axis. Russian insistence on a rapid conclusion of the negotiations was further demonstrated by the demand made by the General Staff on the following day (22 November) that detailed particulars of the type of arms required should be given by the next day. In this connection the Russians emphasized that it was in Yugoslavia's own interest to reply, at once, "Any delay would be extremely dangerous." Thereupon, the Yugoslavs sent the required specifications on 23 November. However, during weeks that followed the negotiations were held up by the Russians. At first, technical difficulties were given as the reason, but later political arguments were openly put forward. Obviously the armaments deal was to be employed in order to bring pressure to bear against, the rapprochement then beginning between the Cvetković Government and the Axis Powers. After some weeks had passed in an attempt to remove, the technical difficulties put forward as a pretext by Russia, the Yugoslav Military Attache in Moscow submitted a report on 4 February 1941 which reads as follows: "On 4 February the Russian War Office informed me that the negotiations concerning the supply of war materials had been delayed by the signing of our Pact with Hungary and the Commercial Treaty with Germany. These treaties are interpreted as an estrangement from Russia. This proves just as clearly as the emphatic statement that price was of no importance, that they are trying to exploit our requirements. for political ends." Evidently no' conclusion of these negotiations was reached under the Cvetković Government.

As is well known, the Belgrade coup d'etat and the Simović Government were hailed with delight by the Russian wireless and the Russian press. There is no doubt that the putschists were already encouraged in making their plans before the overthrow by hopes of Russian help. The expectations of the Simović’ group seemed to be fulfilled when on 5 April 1940 the Russian- Yugoslav Friendship and Non- Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow. This pact, viewed in the light of the attendant circumstances, can only be regarded as a direct provocation of Germany and an encouragement of the Simović Government's anti-German attitude. At the time it awoke a corresponding echo in the press throughout the world. The incompatibility of this treaty with the German-Russian agreements was stressed everywhere. It was looked upon as a decisive turning-point in German Soviet relations; there was even talk of the possibility of the Soviet Union entering the war against Germany. Mr Sumner Welles, American Under-Secretary of State, after several conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, commented on the Russian step as follows: "The Yugoslav-Russian Friendship Pact can under certain circumstances be of the greatest importance. The pact will arouse interest in, many quarters. There are reasons for supposing that it is more than merely a Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact." That the conclusion of the Treaty was regarded by the Simović Government, too, as a challenge to enter the lists against the Reich is incontestably proved by a statement, of which documentary evidence exists, by Ninčić, the Minister, brother of the Foreign Minister in the coup d'etat Government. The fact that after the outbreak of hostilities a large number of Yugoslav military planes flew to Russia to escape destruction, is further evidence of the close connection between Simović and Soviet Russia. Furthermore, according to reliable reports, Yugoslav officers were offered employment in the service of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, documentary evidence is available that Soviet Russia supplied the Yugoslav and Greek General Staffs with information concerning the position and movements of German and Italian troops. Finally, it became known from an absolutely reliable source that on 10 April the Soviet Government proposed to the Yugoslav Minister that war material could be shipped via the Black Sea. The war material was first to be brought to Piraeus. This report shows that the Soviet Government intended to support the Yugoslav action against the Reich at any rate by means of armament supplies and thereby to stab the Reich in the back during its struggle for existence.

This entire policy is manifestly based on the political and military co-operation of the Soviet Union with Britain, and, more recently, with America too. A further indication of this co-operation is, for instance, provided by the order issued on 18 March by Mikoyan, the Commissar for Foreign Trade, prohibiting the transport of war material through Soviet territory. It is quite obvious that this regulation, directed in the first place against Germany's imports from East Asia, was made exclusively in favour of Germany's adversaries. It was quite openly commented on and welcomed as such in the British and American Press.

About this time the diplomatic support given to the British Government by Russia in the Balkans also came to light. As is well known, the journey of Mr Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Istanbul was made with the object of building up a Balkans front in which Turkey was to be included, and if possible of bringing the Soviet Union into the ring as well. The way for this step was to have been paved by Mr Eden's visit to Moscow. Even if this journey came to nothing because the Soviet Union did not consider that the time was ripe formally to take sides with Germany's adversaries, Moscow was still determined to proceed in close co-operation with Britain. This was achieved by the trip to Ankara of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador, in a Russian military plane, and by the intermediary of the Soviet Ambassador there. The result of this discussion was the statement made public on 25 March 1941, in which the Soviet Union, referring to the existing Non-Aggression Pact, assured Turkey of its complete neutrality in the event of possible conflicts. The Associated Press correspondent in Ankara summed up the Soviet Union's aim in so doing as follows: "By eliminating the possibility of counter-action by Russia in the event of Turkey's entering the war on the side of Britain, Moscow is, for the first time, working openly and with weight against German diplomacy." Although the British plans for extending the war failed at that time owing to Turkey's realistic attitude, that did not alter the fact that Russia countenanced Britain's intentions. Moscow pursued the same policy with more success in the case of Yugoslavia, when, in full accord with Britain, it incited the Belgrade putschists to a coup d'etat and encouraged them in their will to fight by the conclusion of the Friendship Pact. Since then the relations between the Soviet Union and Britain in the political and military spheres have become ever closer, as has been made particularly evident by the news recently received of the journey of Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, to London.

Finally, there is documentary evidence proving that negotiations between Moscow and Washington are also proceeding, with the object of establishing a closer political connection between these two States. A confidential circular, which the Soviet Minister in Bucharest addressed to a number of diplomats with whom he had close political connections, triumphantly describes such an alliance as the greatest military and economic force in the world.

Berlin, June 21, 1941